Secessionist diatribes

Talking on the 27^th anniversary of the SPLA/M the Secretary General of the SPLM, Pagan Amum, took a wide stride back into history claiming that the liberation struggle in Southern Sudan started in the 1860s at the time of communal wars involving ‘traditional’ and ‘spiritual’ leaders. In a televised speech he attempted to combine a notion of historical continuity and purpose that leads ultimately to the independence of Southern Sudan next January, presented as the final destination of a long journey of struggle against adversaries, jellaba, British, and Turks. Like all nationalist mythologies this is but an edited, ‘photoshopped’ version of a much more complex and combustible reality, one that Pagan surely knows better.

Once an ardent defender of the ‘New Sudan’, by adopting a mythology of secessionist destiny Pagan has chosen to relinquish the transformative potential he once adhered to as a matter of principle. In his speech he concluded that there is no more chance to make unity attractive and that the people of Southern Sudan are expected to vote for secession, a consequence of the failure of the National Congress Party to make unity attractive over the past 5 years. In a tragic overture Pagan re-directed his skills and competence from the notion of ‘the problem of Sudan’ to the ‘problem of South Sudan’, from self-determination as a hard-won tool to achieve citizenship, voluntary unity and political transformation in an adverse environment, to self-determination as a teleological channel to a historically pre-determined end-station of separation, from the celebration of diversities to a mythology of seclusion and particularity.

In concept, unity is the responsibility of whoever wants unity. Recalling the struggle of SPLA/M against secessionist contenders and adversaries in Southern Sudan, and the history of alliance and comradeship between SPLA/M and a rainbow of Northern based forces since the inception of the movement, and the personal role of Pagan Amum in this history it comes as a surprise that a nuanced leader in his position surrenders to frustration with the ‘ghastly’ NCP and renounces at such short notice a career of opposite intent supported by an active investment in the imagination and pursuit of a future beyond the South/North divide. If the Gordon College Graduates failed at the eve of independence, at the height of their power and prestige, to imagine a Sudan other than the one they inherited form colonial Britain, and thus created a Sudan in their own image, too narrow to survive, the SPLM today, at the height of its political transformative potential but adrift from its inspiring principles of creative unity, is succumbing to lame politics à la Athor or rather à la NCP.

Turabi again

Once again the old master, Hasan al Turabi (78), is sent to prison on the background of ambiguous and undisclosed security threats. The available hint may be the recent upsurge of JEM activity in Kordofan, which made it, at best, to page 2 of some of Khartoum’s newspapers, and did not feature at all in others, focus being on Sudan Armed Forces’ attack on the JEM stronghold in Jebel Moon. Press analyses suggested that Turabi has angered the security apparatus by claiming to have solid evidence to prove electoral fraud, and continually poking the government where it hurts most: the International Criminal Court and Darfur. Well the crackdown did not stop at Turabi, the Popular Congress Party’s (PCP) affiliate newspaper Rai al Shaa’b was closed down, and 3 of its editors were also detained by angered security officers.

However, as has happened behind closed doors in several of Turabi’s previous four detentions under Islamist rule, a number of NCP bigwigs are not particularly happy with his persecution, even ashamed. Qutbi al Mahdi, the leading NCP figure, came out saying that there was no political justification for Turabi’s detention, particularly in the prevailing ‘democratic’ environment, elections and all. Several of NCP’s authorities were actually taken by surprise and had only astonishment to demonstrate. Rather low calibre officials like Rabi Abdel Ati, faced the press and presented the JEM link argument to justify Turabi’s imprisonment.

Apparently the NCP is not one mind about this. Rather, the elections exercise has exposed the false monolith’s lines of disorder. One telling sign is the discrepancy between President Bashir’s 68% (?) and the upper 90s achieved by virtually all NCP candidates at all levels of elections! Yasir Arman’s reading was that the NCP has neglected its president. It seems the decision to win was central however the particular process of winning was left to individual designs. Prior to the elections, and on the background of the framework agreement with JEM, several NCP voices were getting louder about the prospects of reconciliation between the two factions of the Islamist Movement, and even a proposition of PCP participation in government was entertained. Up to the initial declaration of results Turabi seemed to preserve a rather friendly tone suggesting that rigging was not all that flagrant. He was not kept satisfied for long though, the veteran leader and chief ideologue of the Sudanese Islamist Movement was not even allowed into parliament through a proportional representation party list, as opposed to several mediocre singers and football managers who will enjoy the pleasures of the national legislature thanks to the NCP ballot.  

Rebellion tremors

General Athor, the rebellious leader and former independent candidate for the gubernatorial post in Jonglei, expressed tentative willingness to engage in negotiations with the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), a development that followed the confrontation between Athor’s forces and the SPLA last Monday.

It seems GoSS is on the road to foiling a potential wider rebellion through a combination of demonstration of force and negotiation. Hopefully SPLA/M leadership wills succeed in the endeavour and prevent an escalation that may pull a wider area into full-fledged warfare. Contrary to expectations, SPLM/A was more reconciliatory than confrontational, probably in recognition that the General was voicing discontent with local power arrangements rather than outright challenge of SPLA authority.

On Wednesday Athor’s forces and SPLA clashed again, probably in a step by the latter to lax the General’s negotiation position. General Athor’s forces responded somehow on Friday and killed 5 SPLA soldiers in northern Jonglei. One particular risk that GoSS is advised to avoid at all costs, is the conversion of Jongeli, and other areas where there are considerable oil concessions, into a territory contested by warlords heading minor armed factions. Jonglei is the site of a major unexplored oil concession that belongs to the French oil company TOTAL. Territorial breakdown of state authority would breed both armed factions and their financiers, possibly involving transnational corporate interests and adventures of all sorts and kinds.

Only informally has the SPLM hinted at possible NCP meddling, a scenario which also linked Lam Akol to the developments in the area in a wider context of pre-referendum political spoilage. Although plausible, satisfaction with the explanation of the ‘omnipresent’ NCP overlooks the inherent Southern concerns and that have contributed to the escalation of events in Jonglei, foremost the ethnicisation and militarisation of power, and the trajectories of SPLM transformation. If a competent political system is to emerge in the independent Southern Sudan, these questions must be thematised, debated, and adequately addressed. Otherwise the road post-independence may be as rocky and as blood-soiled as the road that promises to lead to independence. SPLM hegemony, phrased in ethnic space as the question of Dinka domination in Southern Sudan, has to justify itself other than by might of the gun and achievement of rule. The politics of exclusion/inclusion in the independent South require channels that feed into a common idea of ‘South Sudan’ rather than to complicity with Khartoum centre. 

Unity for sale

In an environment where the secession of Southern Sudan, a few months from now, is presented as inevitability, particularly from the far stronger powers engineering the fate of the country at a time where its political will and imagination are exhausted in the running of CPA time-tables, the pledge for unity strikes the beholder as an act of obsessive compulsion. While, in fact, the choice between unity and secession is essentially a false one, since neither option, in formality, addresses in earnest the complexities of the Sudanese crisis.

In furthering the cause of unity one bad argument that is being incessantly repeated is ‘unity by incapacity’: the South cannot rule itself; an independent South will immediately slide into civil war, the South lacks infrastructure, and so on. Such argument is music to the proponents of an independent Southern Sudan, since it proves just their point i.e. the South is perceived as inferior and juvenile, and unity implies by default an asymmetric relationship with the North whereby the latter maintains hegemony.

A second bad argument is ‘unity by convenience’, an approach that underlines the difficulties and complexities of the secession process i.e. border demarcation, debt division, Nile waters, oil sharing, citizenship arrangements for Northern Southerners and Southern Northerners, border communities and so on. This is in essence an extension of the first argument with an assumption of transitive direction from unity to secession.

The third bad argument, I suggest, is ‘unity by profit’, implying that the prospects for a prosperous Sudan are greater in unity than in secession, which translates in effect into economic calculus and the odds and bargains of profit extraction and capital accumulation rather than the interests, perceived or actual, of modernity thirsty communities on both sides of the 1956 border.

The fourth, linked to the third above, is ‘unity by default’, recruiting the history of the country to support a perpetual continuation of the past, a line which runs like this: we have inherited this country united and we will maintain it so, take what it takes, an argument that breathes hegemony.

If unity is to be attained it must be ‘unity by creation’, implying recognition of the necessity of transition from a de facto history of ‘secession’ to a yet largely unexplored potential of ‘unity’. Semblances of such ‘unity’ can be found in Sudan’s alternative history: labour! 

The troubled Sayyid

Last Thursday the NCP in a statement made by Ibrahim Ghandoor welcomed the readiness of Mohamed Osman al Mirghani, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) chief and Khatmiyya leader, to participate in the coming government awaiting announcement. Mirghani had never refused the notion of participation in government outright. He however had angry words to say in Khartoum airport before leaving for an Egypt/Saudi Arabia trip right after declaration of election results. Apparently he was frustrated at the bad manners of the NCP which declined to provide him with any mentionable breathing space in the election market. Presumably the Egyptian and Saudi patrons pushed him back into NCP arms without further ado. Whatever the particularities of the deal may be the old party is probably in for a not so major a feast. The most generous of reports suggest an offer of four ministerial portfolios plus/minus with no mention of the lucrative governor posts.

The DUP has already suffered repetitive blows from the predator NCP. It has become difficult over the past years to keep track with the number of splinter factions and break-off groups dropping out of the DUP. The home-coming of the old Sayyid back to Sudan after years of ‘exile’ was expected to reverse the tide of splintering, an expectation that failed to materialise. The party remains in shatters. Even its vintage name from its blossoming era under Ismail al Azhari, the National Unionist Party, has been hijacked by a splinter group claiming consistency with the ‘florid’ past. Today the party is only recognisable as itself through the adjunct ‘original’ after its name, in the same manner Khartoum’s mechanics pride with ‘original’ Japanese spare parts in contradistinction to cheaper versions ‘Made in China’.

The demise of the ‘New Sudan’ as promised by the late John Garang, the man who persistently courted the old Sayyid during the life-span of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and kept him relatively insulated from aggressive NCP flirts, resulted in the direct delivery of Mirghani into NCP arms, and worse still, decisive regional pressures. Today it seems, even the prospects of renewed silence in exile are limited. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Egypt is ready to accommodate a grumpy Sayyid. They would rather see him shaking hands with Bashir and losing yet more fingers.

The irony of the Sayyid’s situation is that he was the man so close to signing a home-made breakthrough peace agreement with John Garang in 1988/1989 promising unity rather than secession if it wasn’t for the NIF’s overnight takeover. Today he may have to be satisfied with an ultra-junior position in an NCP/SPLM government probably presiding over secession, the Asmara Declaration (1995) notwithstanding.

The next rebellion

After several cautious reports the press has decided to christen the military developments in Southern Sudan ‘rebellion’. The first instance in the series post-election was the attack, Friday 30^th April, on the SPLA station in Doleib in the proximity of Malakal, Upper Nile led by forces loyal to General George Athor. The general lost the bid for the post of governor of the lucrative oil-rich Jonglei State to the incumbent Kuol Manyang Juuk, however refuses to acknowledge the result.

 

Then it was reported that a veteran senior SPLA officer, Brigadier General John Jok, has joined forces with General Athor. Still counting, General Dau Aturjong in Northern Bahr el Ghazal is reported to have moved location in the company of around one thousand soldiers. He is also suspected of supporting General Athor’s undertaking. Till the moment of writing the Government of Southern Sudan has issued no formal response to the developments on the ground, nor has the SPLA. It remains to be seen how the GoSS will handle the unfolding situation. 

In the run up to the elections around 340 candidates who initially competed for official SPLM nomination but failed to secure SPLM support decided to enter the poll as independents. In an initial angry response the SPLM stripped them of party membership and prevented them from using party logos and symbol. Among these 340 were General George Athor and General Dau Aturjong, gubernatorial aspirants in Jonglei and Northern Bahr el Ghazal respectively. Following the elections the SPLM relaxed its stance and appeared more conciliatory offering consideration of their return to party ranks provided that appropriate procedures are followed. Well, it turns out the issue is much more thorny than mere party membership.

The dilemma facing the SPLM is that political factions amongst its ranks translate immediately into SPLA blocs and potential mutinies; a concern that raises the old question regarding the capacity of SPLA/M to transform into a political movement commanding an army instead of an amalgam of armed groups with a political wing.

The rebellions facing GoSS seem limited and amenable to resolution if appropriate measures are met to satisfy an angry clientele. However GoSS, possibly governing an independent Southern Sudan in the near future, will have to face the challenge of separating the ballot from the bullet, implying even revisiting the role of SPLA in the dynamics of rule. Otherwise SPLM may well be heading down the path of the Eritrean comrades, purges included.

Secession by design

The voting exercise is over. Bashir is the 68% all Sudan president, and Salva Kiir is the 93% president of the semi-autonomous Southern Sudan, i.e. the two big men preserve total power with a ‘democratic’ topping.

The American press is merrily jingling with the prospects of divorce, imagining scenarios of possible conflict and a probable oil war. The General, Gration, has already presented his default argument conceding that the election was flawed, nevertheless one that sets the stage for political transformation, further stating that the US should focus its attention on getting Southern Sudan ready for independence. According to press reports Khartoum intends to question the General on his remarks regarding the election (al Sahafa, 02.05.10). Apparently the General’s bid is secession of the South and emergence of a new NGO run state which the US is ready to deliver into being.

Public opinion is somehow singing in unison the inevitability of secession, a conclusion resting on the notion of un-attractive unity. However considerations of power may prompt the two ‘big men’ to seriously think otherwise. It seems the two are locked in an ‘arranged marriage’ whereby both can eat the cake and keep it at the same time in case they opt for preservation of the status quo. The oil between the two may well prove to be the necessary glue/grease combination to maintain a complex dual patronage network that is otherwise prone to collapse. Signs of such fractionation became apparent during the elections and in their current aftermath. In the North the Vice President of the NCP, Nafie Ali Nafie, had to threaten local party strongmen in the most violent language to maintain candidacy discipline and prevent an explosion of ‘independents’ from NCP ranks during the run up to the elections. In the South such composure was not readily available and management of post-election dissatisfaction has taken on a military turn.

The dissociation of North from South is a much more intricate procedure than imagined by the American General. He may be looking forward to announcing an independent Southern Sudan next year, but what if Southern Sudan is not, particularly more so that the US has granted the ‘big men’ just the exercise they needed, and stamped their results ‘valid’. The lesson that both have learnt well is that an election is possible without an election. They will be sure to apply the same to the referendum.